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internet
Not only is the Internet the "most participatory form
of mass speech yet developed,"l cyberspace also introduces forms of communication and speech intermediaries
with no precise real space corollaries.2 In particular,
Internet service providers (ISPs), the primary entities
responsible for providing individuals with access to
cyberspace, do not fit neatly into the existing conceptual
boxes for speech intermediaries under First Amendment
law. Like traditional publishers, ISPs create and disseminate content. But they also provide other services,
including Internet access and e-mail and data transmission, similar to those provided by telephone companies
and the postal service. All of these different functions

publishers, and broadcasters. 6
I have argued elsewhere that proponents of open
access are trapped in a First Amendment catch-22.7
Either the ISPs seeking access to cable systems and the
cable ISPs opposing them are both speakers under the
First Amendment and the rights of cable ISPs prevail,B
or neither side may claim First Amendment protection
because providing Internet access is not an expressive
activity.9 The latter conclusion depends upon the existence of First Amendment principles that would permit
the conceptual severance of the various services and
functions provided by ISPs into expressive and nonexpressive components. Traditionally, this conceptual
severance
was
unnecessary
because of the
physical differences and separaappear as part of an integrated seamless package. tion between media. Publishing, broadcasting, and
Moreover, unlike traditional media, ISPs are capable of telecommunications were provided by different entities
exercising absolute control over the information that and separated by different modes of communication.
appears on their networks and who may access that Each mode of communication had its own unique characinformation.
teristics and limitations. Given the convergence of these
The control ISPs are capable of exercising over who forms in the new medium of the Internet, it remains to be
may access their networks and the content that may be seen whether constitutional principles exist that would
accessed clearly raises constitutional concerns with permit the conceptual severance of corresponding activirespect to efforts to regulate the "most participatory form ties when they occur in chorus on the Internet.
of mass speech." How the First Amendment and the
In an effort to determine whether coherent constituprinciples of freedom of speech that it represents will be tional principles exist that would allow the treatment of
applied to the Internet has been the subject of much ISPs as speakers under some circumstances but not othdebate. 3 While the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ers, this Article examines congressional treatment of
American Civil Liberties Union4 resolved the general ISPs under the Communications Decency Act (CDA)lO
question of whether the First Amendment would apply to and the Online Copyright Infringement Liability
the Internet at all, the current controversy over open Limitation Act (OCILLA).ll Because these statutes
access to cable Internet networks raises a more funda- address the circumstances in which ISPs should be submental question. 5 Given the variety of different func- ject to liability for injuries traditionally related to exprestions and services provided by ISPs, how do we deter- sion, defamation, and copyright infringement, they
mine when ISPs should be considered speakers entitled implicitly provide us with insight into the circumstances
to protection under the First Amendment? The answer to in which Congress considers ISPs speakers. While the
this question is critical as traditional media prepare statutes do not directly address what acts of ISPs should
themselves for cyberspace, and as Congress and local be considered expressive activity protected by the First
governments attempt to regulate these speech interme- Amendment, we may draw certain inferences from their
diaries. To answer it, we must address the latent ambi- treatment of ISPs and the assumptions underlying both
guities in First Amendment jurisprudence brought about statutes.
by the Supreme Court's divergent treatment of existing
This Article argues that under the CDA and OCILLA,
mediums for communication, including common carriers, Congress adopted facially inconsistent approaches
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towards ISP liability for expressiOn. Nonetheless,
despite the overt differences, it is possible to discern an
underlying principle for determining when ISPs should
be considered speakers that reconciles this inconsistency.
Put simply, the CDA and OCILLA support an approach
toward determining when ISPs are speakers that focuses
on whether an ISP exercises editorial control over its network. This approach is evidenced by the fact that both
statutes recognize that ISPs
are able to exercise editorial
control over any and all content on their networks, and
both encourage the exercise
of that control in one form
or another.
Part I summarizes the
-~
open access controversy and
explains why the search for
a principled means of analyzing the free speech
claims. of ISPs is necessary.
Parts II & III examine the
CDA and OCILLA and their respective treatments of
ISPs in light of First Amendment concerns. Lastly, part
IV argues that the congressional treatment of ISPs under
those statutes are facially at odds with one another and
cannot be reconciled by coherent legal principles. Part IV
concludes, however, that despite the obvious differences
between the CDA and OCILLA, it is possible to discern
an underlying principle based on editorial control for recognizing when, according to Congress, ISPs can and
should be treated as speakers.

.....

I. Open Internet Access & Free Speech
A The Open Access Controversy
One of the current battles in the war for Internet dominance is being fought over the right to control the market for residential broadband access. Broadband refers
to the ability to deliver information at speeds in excess of
200 kilobits per second (Kbps).l2 In general, Internet
users access their e-mail or surf the web by connecting
with ISPs such as AOL, Prodigy, or Netzero through the
copper twisted wire of the local telephone company.l3
Due to technical limitations, the speed at which information is transmitted through these wires limits the rate at
which data can be transferred to a maximum speed of
fifty-six Kbps_l4 This means that downloading large files
can take hours rather than seconds, changing webpages
72
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may be painfully slow, and receiving full-motion video is
virtually impossible.l5 In contrast, other technologies,
including cable and digital subscriber lines (DSL), are
capable of transmitting data up to one hundred times
faster than traditional telephone lines. 1 6 At that speed,
users can change webpages as quickly as they change
channels on a television, and receiving streaming music
and full-motion video becomes painless.17
The functional differences
between these technologies
are the heart of the open
access controversy. While
just about all ISPs use
broadband
connections
within their networks and
to connect to other networks, most depend upon
copper twisted telepnone
lines to provide the actual
link between the residential
user and the ISP.l8 Since
the Internet is only as fast as
its slowest link, the connection from the home to the
curb-commonly referred to as the "last mile"-generally
dictates the rate at which information is sent and
received by the residential user. Traditionally this "last
mile" has been the most bandwidth-constrained portion
of the Internet.19 However, this is beginning to change
as cable companies upgrade their networks to accommodate the two-way transmission of information, and telephone companies upgrade their networks to provide DSL
service.20
While the upgrading of cable networks continues to be
universally applauded as a necessary improvement of
our communications infrastructure, these changes are
also perceived as threats to the economic survival of
existing non-cable ISPs. 21 In particular, such ISPs are
concerned because after investing billions of dollars to
upgrade their networks, cable companies have begun to
compete with traditional ISPs, providing Internet services themselves or (more commonly) through an exclusive
ISP partner. 22 Given the tremendous bandwidth and
resulting functional differences between cable and regular telephone lines, AOL and other traditional ISPs worried that they would not be able to compete with cable
ISPs in this billion-dollar industry.23 As a result, AOL
and others have lobbied government officials at the local,
state, and federal levels to force cable companies to open
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their networks so that all ISPs can compete to provide
customers with Internet services over .the local cable
company's high-speed network.24 The technological and
resulting competitive advantages of cable over regular
telephone lines also prompted AOL to purchase Time
Warner, thereby acquiring high-speed cable networks of
its own. 25
In response, cable ISPs argue that open access
requirements are preempted by federal law and would
otherwise violate their freedom of speech.26 According to
the cable ISPs, by forcing them to carry competing ISPs
against theiT editorial decision, open access represents
an unconstitutional effort to compel speech.27 While the
current open access cases should be resolved solely on the
basis of preemptive federallaw,28 the distinct possibility
that the law might change and that future legislation
will restrict the free speech rights of ISPs in general29
necessitates an answer to a deceptively simple question:
are ISPs speakers under the First Amendment?

Act would make it a crime for anyone to monitor, intercept, edit, disclose, or otherwise tamper with electronic mail or messages except pursuant to a court order. The Act does not
exempt ISPs.
Under the categorical approach, the Act would be subject
to strict scrutiny. By tying First Amendment protection
to ownership of the communication medium, any interference with the ISP's control over its network would represent an interference with its First Amendment rights.
In contrast, the Act would most likely be upheld under
rational basis review by the functional approach because
e-mail would be considered the functional equivalent of
snail mail, and mail carriers have traditionally not been
afforded First Amendment protection with respect to
their carrying of messages.36 Lastly, the editorial
approach would require a case~by-case analysis. Strict
scrutiny would only apply if the particular ISP objecting
to the Act actually exercises editorial control over e-mail
content.

B. The Search for First Amendment Principles

IT. Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act

As I have written elsewhere, there are three possible
approaches for evaluating the free speech claims of ISPs:
categorical, functional, and editorial. 30 The categorical
approach would treat ISPs as speakers for all purposes
because of their ownership and ultimate ability to control
the information that flows through their networks. 3l In
contrast, both the functional and editorial approaches
would treat ISPs as speakers under some circumstances
but not others. The functional approach would assign
fixed First Amendment rights and duties to each distinct
service offered by ISPs (e-mail, World Wide Web access,
bulletin boards, chat rooms, etc.) by drawing analogies to
corresponding real world activities or by legislative
fiat.3 2
Under the editorial approach, the First
Amendment would protect ISPs as speakers when they
exercise editorial control over the particular service in
question. 33 In other words, with this approach, an ISP
would be considered a speaker only when it actively controls the content available tillough its network.34
How we determine whether ISPs should be entitled to
First Amendment protection will depend upon which of
the three approaches we adopt. Consider the following
hypothetical:

Passed as part of Congress' first attempt to restrict
content on the Internet, the CDA addresses the liability
of ISPs with respect to obscene, indecent, and otherwise
offensive material. Section 230 provides in part that: "No
provider ... of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider."37
The CDA defines an "interactive computer service" as
"any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet
...."38 "Information content providers" are defined as
"any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive com~
puter service."39 The CDA further provides that no ISP
shall be held liable on account of "any action voluntarily
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable ...."40
By its terms, section 230 concludes that ISPs should
not be treated as speakers with respect to any information provided by others and cannot be held liable for

Following a public outcry over the privacy of email communications after the unveiling of the
government's carnivore program, 35 Congress
passes the Electronic Mail Privacy Act. The
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actions taken to restrict access to that content. But while
on its face the CDA appears to provide a definitive
answer to when ISPs should not be treated as speakers,
the statute is both inconsistent with existing law and
internally inconsistent with respect to what acts represent speech. On one hand, it states in clear and unequivocal terms that ISPs should not be considered speakers

for content that they did not originate. In so doing,
Congress rejects the role that editorial control plays in
determining whether one has spoken and therefore
should be held responsible for one's speech. On the other
hand, the CDA then encourages those very same ISPs to
exercise editorial control to censor even constitutionally
protected speech to make the content on the Internet
more "palatable."41 The emperor's new clothes are fine
indeed.
Left intact by the Supreme Court's decision in Reno,
section 230 has become critical in Internet defamation
cases. Notably, two early decisions examining the liability of ISPs for defamation equated an ISP's level of editorial control to that exercised by newspaper publishers
and bookstores.42 In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co., a state court concluded that Prodigy's decision to exercise editorial control over its computer bulletin boards made it appropriate to treat Prodigy as a
publisher of the alleged defamation. 43 From its inception, Prodigy attempted to distinguish itself from other
ISPs by describing itself as the family-oriented network. 44 The ISP claimed that it maintained such an
environment by controlling the content of messages
placed on its bulletin boards.45 By screening messages
before and after their posting, Prodigy made it clear that
open discussion on its network did not mean "anything
goes." As the ISP, Prodigy acted as the final arbiter of
what could and could not be said on its network. 46
According to the court, by consciously choosing "the ben-
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lication available through one of its online databases. 48
Here, it concluded that CompuServe could only be held
responsible as a distributor of the alleged defamation if it
knew or should have known about the defamatory content. 49 But the critical divergence from the Prodigy case
was factual, not philosophical. Unlike Prodigy where
people and software filtered the bulletin boards,
CompuServe only decided whether the publication would

be included in its electronic library without exercising
any control over the publication's content. 50 As such, the
court concluded, "CompuServe has no more editorial control over such a publication than does a public library,
book store, or newsstand .... "5 1 The differences in the
degree and nature of editorial control exercised by
Prodigy and CompuServe, therefore, resulted in different
applications of the same general liability rules.
Prodigy and CompuServe were consistent with traditional defamation law. In general, defamation law subjects publishers of defamatory statements to the same
liability as the original speaker.52 In contrast, distributors such as bookstores and libraries are liable only if
they knew or had reason to know of the defamation. 53
The different liability rules for distributors and publishers reflect the different kinds of editorial control exercised by the two groups, and therefore, the differing
degrees of culpability involved. 54
For example, when an individual repeats what someone else has said or written, she clearly communicates
ideas. More importantly, by speaking, she exercises her
judgment as to the content of that communication. If her
statements include defamatory falsehoods, then her
judgment did not rise to the legally required standard of
care, and she can be considered at fault for what was
said. 55 It is assumed that publishers of print media exercise similar judgment when they determine not only
what news is fit to print, but also what words will be used
to convey the news. 56 Accordingly, we require publishers

efits of editorial control," the ISP, like a newspaper,
became a speaker and publisher of the alleged defamation. Therefore, Prodigy opened itself up to potentially
greater liability for defamation than networks that
choose not to exercise editorial control.47 In other words,
with the privilege of determining what expression would
be made available on its network came the responsibility
of bearing the adverse consequences resulting from that
expressiOn.
In a similar case, the court in Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe Inc. examined an ISP's liability for allegedly defamatory statements contained in an electronic pub-

to exercise the same degree of care as our street corner
speaker.
In contrast, it is not always reasonable to hold distributors of speech responsible for what they distribute. 57
Bookstores and libraries are not familiar with all of the
content they distribute. As recognized by the Supreme
Court, the First Amendment thus prevents the imposition of no-fault liability for distributors because: "Every
bookseller would be placed under an obligation to make
himself aware of the contents of every book in his shop.
It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near
74
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an approach to omniscience."58 Moreover, strict liability
for distributors would "become the public's burden, for by
restricting [the bookseller] the public's access to reading
matter would be restricted. If the contents of bookshops
and periodical stands were restricted to material of
which their proprietors had made an inspection, they
might be depleted indeed."59 Unless the newsstand
operator knows or has reason to know of the defamation,
therefore, we do not consider her responsible for the

vidual posted a message on an AOL bulletin board
describing the sale of tasteless shirts relating to the
Oklahoma City bombing, listing Zeran's telephone number as the number to call to purchase the shirts.
Following the posting, Zeran received numerous angry
calls and even death threats.68 He complained to AOL,
which removed the original message but failed to prevent
the anonymous poster from posting several similar messages.69 Zeran argued that AOL should be considered a
distributor of allegedly defamatory material posted on its
bulletin boards, and that the CDA left distributor liability intact.70 In rejecting this argument, the court concluded that distributor liability "is merely a subset, or
subspecies, of publisher liability ...."71
While the Zeran court is clearly right that in the parlance of defamation distributors "publish" statements, it

speech she distributes.
Despite the different liability rules for distributors and
publishers, both are protected speakers under the First
Amendment. 60 Publishers are considered speakers
because they select what statements and materials will
go into their publication;61 distributors because they
select which publications to distribute.62 The protected

is unclear whether Congress intended to employ the
broad definition of "publisher" used in defamation law
when it crafted §230.72 Nonetheless, the court's conclu-

status of both publishers and distributors remains the
same regardless of whether the form of communication is
tangible or electronic. Thus, the Supreme Court has protected the free speech rights of broadcasters to determine

sion appears consistent with the CDA. Regardless of
whether distributors are
publishers in the lexicon of defamation or in
the ordinary meaning
of the word, both distributors and publishers are speakers, and
the CDA specifically
states that ISPs should
not be treated as speakers.73

what to broadcast on their
networks, 63 and cable
operators to determine
what programming to
carry over their cable
systems.64 In contrast,
common carriers such as
telephone
companies,
which do not exercise
any editorial control
over the content that travels over their networks, do not have First Amendment
rights and are immune from defamation liability. 65
Consequently, prior to the CDA, an ISP's free speech
rights and responsibilities, like those of other media,

In Blumenthal v. Drudge, a federal district court
agreed with the Zeran decision when it concluded that
the CDA barred another action against AOL for allegedly defamatory statements contained in a gossip column
entitled the "Drudge Report."74 While Zeran involved
messages posted by an anonymous third party, AOL's

would depend upon the type of editorial control it exercised.

relationship with Drudge was much more involved. At
the time, Drudge had entered into a licensing agreement
with AOL to make his report available to all AOL members. 75 Pursuant to the agreement, AOL paid Drudge

However, by concluding that no ISP "shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider," section 230 of
the CDA appears to reject the common law scheme of liability with respect to ISPs.66 Thus, in Zeran v. America
Online. Inc.. the Fourth Circuit agreed with America
Online that through section 230, "lawsuits seeking to
hold a service provider liable for its exercise of publisher's traditional editorial functions-such as deciding
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content-are barred."67 In that case, an unidentified indi-

$3,000 per month, promoted his report to current and
potential subscribers, and retained the right to exercise
editorial control over the content of the Drudge Report. 76
Despite AOL's relationship with Drudge and the fact that
it was much more than a 'passive conduit like the telephone company,' the court concluded that liability was
75
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precluded by the CD A. 77
In granting AOL immunity from liability, the court
appeared to distinguish between actual and potential
editorial control. Critical to the court's decision was the
fact that even though AOL had the contractual right to
control the content of the Drudge Report, there was no
evidence that it actually had any role in writing or editing the report. 78 In fact, the plaintiffs ultimately represented that Drudge was the only person who investigated, wrote, edited, and otherwise supervised the content of
the report.79 This distinction is critical because presumably if AOL had actually edited the contents of Drudge's
report, it would have been
considered an information
content provider as an
entity "responsible, m
whole or.· in part, for the
creation or development of
information
provided
through the Internet," and
thus its immunity would
be lost. so While the Drudge
court's conclusion that AOL was not responsible in any
degree for the content of the Drudge Report does not
appear to be compelled by the CDA (which does not distinguish between actual versus potential editorial control
over a publication's contents), it highlights an important
distinction made by Congress. Under the CDA, an individual or entity is treated as a speaker only when it creates or develops the content in question.Sl In contrast,
content transmission, post-publication editing, or postpublication blocking in whole or in part by an ISP does
not make the ISP responsible for that content.S2
Why Congress made this decision can be explained by
the CDA's purpose and history. In general, the conclusions reached in Zeran and Drudge are supported by the
CDA's purpose and history. As the Drudge court recognized, section 230 of the CDA represents Congress' effort
to enlist the aid of ISPs in eliminating offensive material
from the Internet. 83 Cubby and Stratton Oakmont clearly stood in the way of that purpose. If an ISP could be
held responsible for the content available through its networks whenever it exercised editorial control over that
network by removing or blocking access to certain content, Congress believed that ISPs would choose not to
eliminate offensive material for fear of being subject to
liabilities traditionally associated with editorial control.
Furthermore, if ISPs faced tort liability for information
76
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distributed by others, the growth of the Internet might be
threatened. 84 Accordingly, the legislative history of section 230 specifically states:
One of the specific purposes of this section is to
overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and any
other similar decisions which have treated
such providers and users as publishers or
speakers of content that is not their own
because they have restricted access to objectionable materia1.85
To that end, Congress concluded that ISPs should not
be treated as speakers with respect to content that they
did not create.
Speakers
under the CDA, therefore,
are limited to the original
creators of content; subsequent decisions to transmit, edit, or block content
are not treated as components of speech. To use a
non-Internet
example,
under this approach, the
producers and creators of the television show "Survivor"
would be considered the speakers while CBS and its affiliates would not-even though they decided to broadcast
the program and censor portions of the program during
the broadcast. Additionally, under the Drudge court's
interpretation of the CDA, "Survivor" would not be considered CBS's speech even if the network had the right to
control the production of the series but chose not to do
so.S6
Even though the framework established by the CDA
may make sense in instrumental terms-Congress clearly wanted to eliminate indecent material on the Internet,
and if it could not do so directly, it would enlist the aid of
ISPs87_it is difficult to discern any principled distinctions between ISPs and other speakers under these circumstances. Assuming that it is inappropriate to hold
ISPs to the standard of liability for publishers unless
they are directly involved in creating the content, why is
distributor liability not appropriate?
Consider two variations on the facts of Zeran. One,
after receiving notice that the posting was potentially
defamatory and injurious to Zeran, AOL decides not to
remove the initial posting or block the subsequent postings because it thinks the messages are funny and should
be accessible to the public. Or two, after receiving notice,
instead of blocking the posting outright, AOL deletes the

internet
portions ofthe messages it considers to be offensive, leav- problems that the Internet presents for copyright law.
ing the rest intact, including Zeran's· telephone number, The Internet not only brings with it the potential to facilbecause it determines that the unedited material should itate copyright infringement, but it also raises fundabe seen by the public. Under the Zeran and Drudge deci- mental conceptual difficulties for copyright law. What
sions, the CDA would immunize AOL in both hypotheti- constitutes a copy? Is data stored in an ISP's server
cals because AOL did not create the messages, irrespec- "fixed" for the purposes of copyright law? What duties
tive of the fact that it now has actual knowledge that the and liabilities should ISPs be subject to as speech intermessages are causing harm to Zeran. If a magazine pub- mediaries when allegedly infringing information is translisher can be held responsible for knowingly publishing mitted over their networks?
The Online Copyright Infringement Liability
harmful classified advertisements, 88 why should ISPs be
Limitation Act (OCILLA) was CongTess' answer to these
held to a different standard of accountability?
Zeran suggests a possible answer. According to the questions. 93 Following the White House proposal that all
court, this immunity is necessary in order to preserve electronic storage of information should be treated as a
freedom of speech on the Internet. The court stated that fixed copy under copyright law,9 4 OCILLA immunizes
unlike traditional print publishers, ISPs will face "an ISPs from copyright liability when the allegedly infringimpossible burden" even if required to investigate claims ing content is: 1) transmitted through digital communiof defamation given "the sheer number ofpostings" avail- cations;95 2) cached on the ISP's system;96 3) residing on
able through their network.89 This in turn would create the network at the direction of users;97 or 4) made accesa "natural incentive simply to remove messages upon sible through information location tools. 98 As with the
notification, whether the contents were defamatory or CDA, Congress predicates immunity upon a finding that
not."90 Additionally, the court noted that distributor lia- the ISP did not originate the content. 99 Further, as in
bility would naturally deter ISPs from censoring materi- the CDA, if the ISP is directly responsible for the infringal because those efforts would lead to notice of potential- ing content, it cannot escape liability under OCILLA.
At this point, however, the similarities between the
ly defamatory material. 91 If true, the first explanation
would certainly be a cause for concern and sufficient jus- acts end. After distinguishing between the original contification for immunity. However, as part III later tent provider and those that merely act as conduits for
demonstrates, given the fact that Congress imposed dis- that content, OCILLA imposes four additional requiretributor-type liability upon ISPs in the context of copy- ments upon ISPs before they qualify for immunity under
right infringement, the Zeran court's "censor first and the statute. First, the ISP cannot exercise any editorial
ask questions later" argument is simply a post-hoc justi- control over the material. Even if it originates from
fication that rings hollow.
someone other than the ISP, if the ISP exercises any disFurthermore, not only is the court's argument that cretion in selecting the material100 or the recipients,101
ISPs would be deterred from censoring speech on the or if the ISP modifies the content of the materials, 102 it
Internet unsupportable by the First Amendment, it is will not be immune from copyright liability. Second, the
also antithetical to the promotion of a vibrant and ISP cannot have actual knowledge that "the material or
responsible free market place of ideas. While Congress an activity using the material on the system or network
may have paid lip service to the values of free expression is infringing''103 or knowledge "of any facts or circumin the CDA, the statute itself threatens rather than pro- stances from which infringing activity is apparent."104
motes freedom of speech. The CDA does not simply rec- Third, if an ISP obtains knowledge or awareness of
ognize the private editorial rights of ISPs, it encourages allegedly infringing material either on its own or after
private censorship of speech by immunizing ISPs from all receiving notice from a third party, the ISP must act
liability with respect to their editorial decisions, creating "expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the matean environment for unrestrained and irresponsible cen- rial."105 Lastly, the ISP cannot receive any financial bensorship.92
efit directly from the allegedly infringing material or
activity.106
~· The Online Copyright Infringement
Unlike the CDA, OCILLA recognizes that an ISP's
Liability Limitation Act
post-creation exercise of editorial control over content on
Congress' next effort to regulate ISPs responded to the its network renders the ISP responsible for that content.
77
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Whether the ISP is altering the content of the message, strong under OCILLA as it would be under the CDA.
selecting which materials to make accessible in a data- Nonetheless, Congress chose to impose distributor liabilbase, or independently directing materials to particular ity upon ISPs under OCILLA, and, whatever the legislarecipients, the ISP is exercising control over its network tive intent, courts have chosen not to find the same in the
similar to the editorial control exercised by newspaper CD A.
publishers, broadcasters, and cable operators. Liability
under these circumstances is akin to publisher liability
Irreconcilable Differences?
under defamation law.
At face value, the approaches taken by Congress in
OCILLA, however, does not stop there. In addition to section 230 of the CDA and OCILLA clearly conflict with
publisher liability, the Act recognizes liability for ISPs one another. The CDA immunizes ISPs from liability
similar to distributor liability. Even when an ISP does under all circumstances except when the ISP itself is the
not exercise editorial control over content residing on or original source of the content. This approach treats ISPs
transmitted through its network, OCILLA recognizes as common carriers, like telephone companies or postal
potential liability for an ISP's subsequent failure to exer- carriers, which do not exercise editorial control over the
cise that control. By conditioning immunity upon an messages they carry, and correspondingly do not have
ISP's lack of actual knowledge or awareness of copyright recognized speech rights or responsibilities.llO The CDA
violations and requiring that
does so despite the fact that
>···
an ISP act expeditiously to
ISPs can and do exercise ediremove or disable access to
torial control over their netthe allegedly infringing
works similar to publishers of
material once it has such
print publications. In conknowledge or awareness,
trast, OCILLA not only
subsections 512(c) and (d)
leaves ISPs open to liability
mirror distributor liability
when they are the source of
under defamation law.
the infringing content, but
~eech
The liability scheme
also subjects them to liability
under OCILLA, therefore, is
when they simply exercise
directly at odds with the one ~respe-et~ttJ-g1~ir-e~i-teritt1-a~e-i:5fen:5,-Grea-f--i editorial control-or, under
established by the CDA. By
certain circumstances, fail to
imposing both publisher and
exercise such control. This
distributor liability upon
divergent treatment of ISP
ISPs, OCILLA undermines
liability exists despite compathe Zeran court's explanation for why distributor liabili- rable degrees of culpability and burden. As a result, this
ty for ISPs should not be recognized under the CDA.l07 section addresses whether there is a way to reconcile
Clearly, ISPs would be under the same burden to exam- these divergent approaches, and suggests that despite
ine and evaluate the volume of claims for copyright the overt differences between the statutes, both statutes
infringement as they would defamation claims. ISPs recognize the editorial control of ISPs.
would also have the same incentive to censor first and
ask questions later. In fact, given the potential for sig- A. Explanations
nificant damage awards with respect to copyright
Can the apparent differences between the CDA and
infringement,lOS ISPs arguably have a greater incentive the OCILLA be reconciled? One answer is suggested by
to censor in cases involving alleged copyright infringe- legal realism and public choice theory. Perhaps the copyment. Moreover, OCILLA not only recognizes the poten- right and entertainment industries simply have more
tial for ISPs simply to restrict access to challenged con- political power than victims of defamation and plaintiffs'
tent, but also encourages ISPs to take such action by attorneys, or they have been more successful at capturimmunizing them for censoring first and asking ques- ing the legislative process. One could argue that
tions later.l09 The First Amendment threat of private Congress is more concerned with protecting the informaand perhaps public censorship, therefore, is just as tion industry from potential harm than protecting indi£")._
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viduals. Simply put, the differences between the CDA
and OCILLA are not the result of prineipled decisionmaking. Although public choice theory may explain
these differences, it does little to guide us in a search for
unified First Amendment principles except to tell us that
focusing on Congress may render our project in vain.
However, unless one requires a slavish reliance upon
actual intent (if such a thing is ever discernable), the fact
that the differences between the CDA and OCILLA may
not reflect reasoned and/or consistent policy choices does
not undermine their value as examples that shed some
light on the question of when ISPs should be considered
speakers.
Another possible explanation for the different treatment is that copyright and defamation have different
relationships to speech. While defamation is absolutely
tied to speech because by definition it involves the communication of a defamatory statement, copyright
infringement includes acts unrelated to expression. For
example, the individual who photocopies a new Stephen
King novel from cover to cover without permission from
the copyright holder is clearly making an unauthorized
copy. But is she speabng? While many may consider the
act of photocopying copyTight infringement, few would
consider it speech, as it often lacks any expressive component.

siders copyright infringement unrelated to speech. If the
Act only permitted an ISP to be subject to liability when
that ISP is the original source of the allegedly infringing
content or has actual knowledge or awareness of facts of
the infringement, 116 it might be plausible to interpret it
as recognizing liability for acts unrelated to speech.
Under those circumstances, OCILLA would permit liability because the ISP is committing a direct act of infringement by "copying" protected materials or aiding others in
making those copies. Nonetheless, as discussed above,
OCILLA imposes copyright liability under additional circumstances_l17 For example, an ISP loses immunity
under the OCILLA simply by selecting what material
will be transmitted over its network, selecting the recipients of that material, or by modifying the contents of the
contents of the material.118 Moreover, knowledge or
awareness that the material may be infringing is not
required under those circumstances. Congress simply
concluded that by exercising editorial control over the
material on their networks, ISPs, like print publishers,
should have knowledge of the allegedly infringing material. OCILLA, therefore, recognizes liability specifically
under circumstances when the alleged copyright
infringement results from what may be considered an
ISP's speech.

B. Reconciling the Irreconcilable

There are, however, two major objections to this explanation. First, copyright law clearly implicates speech
and First Amendment concerns.lll Copyright infringement includes not only the act of copying itself, but also
the act of communicating copyrighted materiaJ.l12 By

Despite the overt conflict between the CDA and OCILLA with respect to liability, congressional treatment of
ISPs under these statutes may still yield a coherent
approach for determining when ISPs are speakers.
Because the statutes only address ISP liability for

limiting the circumstances in which individuals and entities may express themselves, copyright law clearly implicates speech. In other words, when I give you an MP3 of
a Metallica song, it may seem as though I am not communicating anything more than that I think you might
enjoy the song. However, when I give you an unauthorized copy of Tracy Chapman's "Talking About a
Revolution" to awaken your political consciousness or I
copy text from your webpage and post that text on mine
for others to see, expression is undeniable. Under the
current copyright regime, unless the particular use of the
copyrighted material is privileged by statute,113 falls
under the statutory exceptions for fair use,114 or is otherwise protected by the First Amendment, 115 expression
can violate copyright law.

speech, it is quite possible to assume that Congress recognized a uniform approach for determining when ISPs
speak, and simply chose to immunize ISPs for some types
of speech but not for others. As such, the CDA's statement that ISPs should not be treated as publishers or
speakers does not necessarily represent Congress' conclusion that they are not publishers or speakers even
with respect to content originated by others. It may only
represent a congressional conclusion that ISPs should
not be held responsible for objectionable material as a
matter of public policy even when that material should
be considered their speech. Whether Congress could
limit an ISP's ability to speak by modifying content originated by others, selecting the materials to make accessible to users, or selecting which users will receive the
material, therefore, would present an entirely different

Second, the requirements established by OCILLA
themselves undermine any argument that OCILLA con79
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question. In other words, the CDA and OCILLA do not
necessarily directly address whether ISPs are speakers
or whether they have a right to exercise editorial control
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sional treatment of ISPs in an effort to determine when
they should be considered speakers for First Amendment
purposes. The prominence of editorial control in the pro-

over their networks.
Moreover, despite the different approaches towards

visions and history of the CDA and OCILLA suggest that

ISP responsibility for speech, both statutes recognize

with the editorial approach. Neither statute takes the

that ISPs have the capacity to exercise editorial control

categorical approach, imposing liability based upon own-

over content on their networks. In fact, an ISP's editori-

ership of the communications medium alone. Similarly,

congressional treatment of ISPs as speakers is consistent

al control over its network plays a prominent role in both

both statutes recognize an ISP's editorial control with

the CDA and OCILLA. As discussed earlier, the CDA

respect to its network as a whole rather than limiting

insulates ISPs from liability for any action taken "to

that control to discrete and particular services under the

restrict access to or availability of material" that may be

functional approach.

considered objectionable_l19

Congress provided this

statutes, and legislation introduced in Congress specifi-

immunity to harness an ISP's independent editorial con-

cally on the issue of open access appears to reject an edi-

trol for its own ends-namely, the elimination of obscene

torial approach towards speech by proposing common

and indecent material on the Internet.120

Similarly,

carrier obligations for ISPs.122 Moreover, because the

OCILLA recognized an ISP's editorial control over con-

CDA and OCILLA only address ISP liability for expres-

These are, however, only two

tent when it limited immunity to circumstances in which

sion and not whether they have a right to speak, they

the ISP does not exercise that editorial control. 121 Thus,

present us with only half the picture. While it remains

while the statutes differ with respect to the consequences

to be seen how Congress, let alone the Supreme Court,

of exercising editorial control, their recognition of an

will treat ISPs in the context of open access or in other

ISP's editorial control is undeniable.

cases that implicate the freedom of speech of ISPs directly, the CDA and OCILLA suggest a presumption in favor

CONCLUSION

of the editorial approach.
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